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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE

REDUCTION OF US. FORCES IN
EUROPE
Mr MANSFIELD. Mr. President. I
send lo the desk a resolution and ask
that It be read, along wL. lhe names of
the cosponsors.
s. n~,. 40
Whereas tho foreign policy and milito,ry
gtrength of the Untted States are dedicated
to the protection or our national security,
the prest'rvatlon of the liberties or the Amencan people, and the m:untcnance or world
peace: and
Whereas the United States In Implementing
these principles hns maintained hu-ge contingents of American Armed Forces in
Europe, together with air and naval units,
for twenty years; and
Whereas the security or the United States
and Its citizens remains Interwoven with the
security or other nations signatory to the
North Atl.lntic Treaty as It was when the
treaty was signed, but the condition or our
European allies, both economically o,nd militarily. has appreciably Improved since large
contingents or forces were deployed; a.nd
Whereas the means and capacity of all
members of the North AWmtic Treaty Organization to provide forces to resist aggression bas significantly Improved since the
original United States deployment: and
Whereas the commitment by all members
o! the North Atlantic Treaty Is based upon
the full cooperation of all treaty partners
In contributing materials and men on a !air
and equitable basis, but such contributions
have not been forthcoming !rom all other
members or the Organization: and
Whereas relations between Eastern Europe
and Western Europe were tense when the
large contingents of United States forces were
deployed In Europe but this situation has
now undergone substantial change and rela·
t!ons between the two parts o! Europe are
now characterized by an Increasing two-way
tlow or trade, people and other peaceful exchange: and
Whereas the present pol!cy or maintaining
large contingents or United States forces and
their dependents on the European Continent
also contributes further to the fiscal a.nd
monetary problems or the United States:
Now, therefore, be It
Resolved, That(I) It Is the sense of the Senate that, with
changes and Improvements In the techniques
of modern warfare a.nd because of the vast
increase In capacity or the United States to
wage war a.nd to move rnil!tary forces a.nd
equlpment by air, a substantial reduction or
United States forces prcmenently stationed
In Europe can be made without adversely
affecting either our resolve or ab!l!ty to meet
our commitment under the North Atlantic
Treaty;
(2) s. Res. 99, adopted In the Senate
April 4, 1951, Is amended to contain the provisions or this resolution a.nd, where the
resolutions may conflict. the present resolution Is contro!Ung as to the sense or the
Senate.

The list of cosponsors is as follows:
Senators YOUNG of Ohio, MORSE, RANDOLPH, Ml.TCALF, PEARSON, JORDAN of
Idaho, YOUNG of North Dakota, BOGGS,
INOUYE, DOMINICK, LoNG Of Missouri,
HATFIELD, ERVIN, LONG Of Louisiana, BYRD
of West Virginia, HILL, RUSSELL, MAGNUSON, PASTORE, SYMINGTON, MUSKIE, HART,
BREWSTER, TALMADGE, YARBOROUGH, McINTYRE, BARTLETT, MOSS, PROXMIRE, FuLBRIGHT, McGOVERN, BURDICK, ELLENDER,
NELSON, AIKEN, CARLSON, WILLIAMS of
Delaware, GRUENING, ALLOTT, COTTON,
and SMATHERS.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, for
the information of the Senate, I think

that the total number of sponsors ls 41
at this point.
I ask unanimous consent that the resolution be referred both to the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Forei<Yn Relations.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection? The Chair hears none, and
It Is so ordered.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that both these
committees may have authority to appoint subcommittees which will act
jointly.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection? The Chair hears none, and
i.t is so ordered.
The resolution CS. Res. 49) was referred to the Committee on Armed Services and the Commitlce on Foreign
Relations.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that the resolution which I have offered today lie at the
desk for 1 week for cosponsors.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, the resolut,on will be held at
the desk, as requested by the Senator
from Montana.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, Senate Resolution 300 in the 89th Congress
was intended to express the sense of the
Senate that a substantial reduction of
U.S. forces permanently stationed in Europe can be made without adversely affecting our resolve or ability to meet our
commitment under the North Atlantic
Treaty. It will be recalled that the resolution had acquired a total of 32 sponsors by the end of the 89th Congress.
In spite of this substantial interest, the
leadership decided not to press the matter to a decision during the closing days
of the last session. Notice was served,
however, that the matter would be reopened in January.
Just prior to the convening of the 90th
Congress, the original sponsors of the
resolution met to consider a course in the
matter. After a thorough discussion, It
was decided once again, with 12 of the
13 Members assenting, that the resolution on U.S. troop deployment in Europe
should be reintroduced without delay. It
was also agreed that the President should
be advised of the intention to do so and
that, on this occasion, all Members of
Senate should be invited to cosponsor
the resolution if they so desired.
I find it regrettable, Mr. President,
that nothing has happened since the
close of the last session to Indicate that
this resolution is any less necessary today than 1t was several months ago. At
that time, I expressed the hope that the
introduction of the resolution, of itself,
might prove to be helpful in,bringing
about adjustments in U.S. troop num·
bers in Europe. However, what looked
like a hopeful move in that direction
last fall has apparently turned out to be
merely another exercise in marking time.
It is my personal belief, therefore, that
the resolution on U.S. troop deployment
in Europe is, if anything, more timely
than it was during the last session, and
that the Senate is more than ever justified In coming to grips with the matter
in this session. Let me review some of
the specific considerations that have led
me to this conclusion.
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The request that our forces be withdrawn from France seemed to provide an
excellent opportunity to bring home approximately 70,000 of the 900,000 or more
American defense personnel and dependents now stationed throughout Western
Europe. Instead, the Defense Department is In the process of moving at least
two-thirds of these forces along with
their dependents who have been in
France, not back to the United States,
but on to the United Kingdom, West Germany, and the Low Countries. Thus, the
reduction in overall U.S. personnel levels
in Ew·ope will be insignificant. I must
confess, Mr. President, that It is most
difficult to understand why some air units
can be moved from France back to the
States, under a dual-basing concept-and a few are being moved-but the balance must be assigned elsewhere in
Europe.
It is also difficult to understand why
we will not face up to the fact that the
Western European allies are uninterested in stocking supplies and organizing
lines of communications to sustain forces
for a hypothetical 90-day conventional
war on the Continent. Indeed, their
outlays in this connection are hardlY
sufficient to sustain their NATO forces
for 30 days or even, In some instances,
for 10 days. Nevertheless, the Defense
Department still clings to the 90-day
concept, and we pay heavily In terms of
the number of supporting troops and depots which are required to maintain lt.
Most disturbing, in my view, has been
the revelation of the rigidity of our policy with respect to NATO, as it emerged
in the recent United States-United
Kingdom-West German talks on troop
deployment, strategy, and offset arms
purchases. These tripartite talks seem
to have led, as I have already noted, at
best, only to interim decisions on our
part to maintain the status quo and postpone the hard decisions. Indeed, these
talks have taken us, if anything, further
toward a un!lateral U.S. underwriting o!
the burdens of NATO.
What was heralded months ago by unnamed sources in this QQvernment as a
move to get the Europeans to take a
greater share of NATO's burdens, has
produced precisely the opposite results.
Indeed, It Is ironic that the principal decision of the receTJt tripartite Conference
involves a new U.S. commitment to buy
$35 m1111on worth or arms and services
from Great Britain In order to stave off
the reductions in the British Army o!
the Rhine which London had previously
announced It felt compelled to make. To
put it bluntly, this Conference reveals
a disconcerting tendency to beg or to bug
all1es Into a certain view of NATO's current needs which is based on a conviction
of urgency that they do not necessarily
share.
It has been said before, Mr. President,
but it bears repeating: the United States
Is the only member of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization which has met its
commitments to the common defense effort. No member of NATO spends as
much o! its gross national product on
defense as does the United States. No
NATO member has as great a percentage
of Its available manpower in uniform as
does the United States. The costly
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st.nndards or Lrainlng, equipment, staffing and logistics v.hich hav b en malnta ned for the six US dlrl ion on ~he
European Contlntn h v not b n cv n
remotdy approached by any other
NATO nation.
to t sl mtlcant I should be not d
only three mcmb rs of NATO, oth r than
th • United Stnws. t1ll require 2 years
of compulsory en1ce from th lr army
draftee . 'The e members nrc Portugal,
Or cc. and Turkey. Great Brttam ha
long since abandoned consenptlon entirely as long ago as 1960. Other Western f~uro)~an nations ha\e either also
ended compulsory rnlllt.ary ~rvice, or
sharplv reduced the term of their manpower draft.
Fnmce no longer sct>s a need to a.o;slgn
anv forces to NATO or en~n to guaranU'r
othC'r NATO forces access to French tcrrttory. W t Germany has the t'QUhalcnt of 8, rather than the committed 12
divtsions marutcd, equipped and staffed
Finally, not only Great Bntain, a:; noted,
but Belguim as \\ell Is anxious to reduce
lls commttments of troops to NATO.
Jt set-ms to me tlla t It Is long past the
time not only to recognize contemporary
European rcalillcs but to act on them.
There is no longer any blinking the fact
that the European governments do not
feel as imminently threatened from the
East or by internal upheaval as was the
case 15 years ago Western Europe is
consrious of Its stability and confident of
Its ability to maintain an unprecedented
prosperity, in part, by expanding commercial and other intercourse with Eastern Europe and even with Communist
China. The list of commodities which
the NATO natwns are prepared to exclude from this trade for strategic rcasons grows ever shorter.
Tlwre is, Mr. Pre.'ildent, obviously a
growing EuroJ)(!an conviction that an era
of J)E'aceful coexistence in Europe is
more than a Jl0..%ibllity for the future;
for them, 1t is already here. President
De Gaulle Is most articulate in giving
expression to this v1ew as wpll as to other
pan-European concepts. But It is a view
whtch, in my judgment, finds increasing
echo In Western Germany, Italy, the
United Kingdom, and other EuroJ)('an
nations. Indeed. rE'C(>nt official expressions of the policies of our own Government suggest a belief in the possibility
of advancing PE'nce through expanded
trade and other relations with Eastern
Europe and a readiness to participate
actively in a broad Pl'OCt•ss of reconciliation. A f0elect1ve but substantial reduction of our troop commitments to NATO
is not out of step w1th these new probings
of our PQhcy. IndE'ed, 1t could become
central to furthering that development
I do not believe that we must \\a it for
othe1 s to act first or that we must negotiat~ formal agreements on troop reductwn~ in order to do what is right for thiS
Nat.wn. The actron,.; of others may or
may not be reciprocal or syncretic 'lloith
our own. Both the Western EuroJ)ean
natwns and the Sonet Union have mnde
1ndl\1dual nalional decisions of this kind.
We can do the same if a roouct1on of
US. forces In Europe w1ll serve--as I
bellt>ve 1t v.ill-this Nation's Inter ts in
thf' context of our vital concern in the
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North Atlantic re lou and our c neral
po Uon tn the v.orld
There 1S not
magic number or US.
troops "'hlch, Vi hen tnUon ~~ in Euro1 ,
v.ill guarantee a lnst probes from U1e
East or a r crud scene of mU1 rl m m
the W t There Is not a magw 11um r
of U.S troops \\hlch ean underwnte our
diplomacy and Insure ult1mntc solutions
of Europe s problems ns w c think they
should be solved
A sub tantlal reduct1on m .S forces
In Europe v.ould sttlllea\e an lmpressne
U.S. military presence on the Io.'uropean
Continent TheUS. treaty commltnll'nt
to the defense of We tern Europe under
the North Atlantic Treaty \\ould rernam Intact. In that context, tlwre
\\OUld be no abandonment of mternatlonal responslbllllles and no lm ita ttou
to pro\ ocallon
Indeed, v. hat nation would be so foolhardy as to believe that a reduction m
US. forces stationed m Europe 1. e\ 1dence of \\eakness or lack of wlll'' What
nation would be so foolhardy as to conclude that the Umted States, which has
fielded se' era! hundred thousand men m
VIetnam, on the fringes of its vital internatiOnal interests. would abandon the
North Atlantic region which is a cornerstone of tho<c interests? If there is war
agam in Euro)Je or over It-make no filStake-the United States will be party to
it, \\ hether· or not there are s1x divi'<ions
or six battalions of Amcncan forces Ol•
the European Contment.
If NATO Is to survive, and I belie1·e
that v.e should make every effort to see
that it does survive, the Orgamzatlon
must be adapted to reflect the changing
attitude~ and preoccupations of all of Its
members
I am personally persuaded
that the most urgent adaptatiOn which IS
reqmred is a reduction downward In the
US. troop commitment on the Continent.
In all frankness, Mr. President, I believe
we should face now the prospect that
other NATO members In addition to
Jo'rance mnv also find large contingents
of Americans on their soil as uncomfortably excessive to need In the not-toodistant future. It would be wise to anttcipate other invitations to reduce our
militarv establishment. And insofar as
I am concerned, it would appear more
compatible with the dignity of this Nation and more conducive to the maintenance of a useful NATO as well as
overall fnendly North Atlantic relations
if v. e were to act to reduce our troops
now of our own volition, rather than in
a fit of pique under lcs.~ auspicious circumst.ances. I regret to say that the
temper tantrums which characterized
the reactions of unnamed ''official
sources" in this Government to the
French request for our withdrawal and
the earlier Senate resolution on the subject do not auger well for the future.
The considerations I have just reVIewed, Mr. President, have led me to
the conclusion that the resolution on
troop deployment wh1ch is being reintroduced today Is both timely and necessary My colleagues may ha'e other reasons for reaching tl.l' same conclusiOn
I am not unmindful that some would
hold as perhaps even more Important,
that a cut in troops In Europe means a
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cut In U
ld outfl
resuii.S from Urf p
nc or
null on American defer
1
ru cl nd
dependents In
rro
or Lhnt
cut or
force In
rope ould
t thl •' tion
In me tlng I he \Y commiLm nts cl "'here In U e "'orld. no bly II \ lctn m
l\ly o 11 \I\\, 1 reit.cra ,I U ,,t \\llh
or \\ ithouL n urob!C'nt of
In nee uf
pa) m nts, \\ith or \\iU10ut th • immt•n
r uln•ments ot \'letnam. the wductlon
or us fore• in We rn Europe Is Ju lifted on Its ov. n merits.
lonc-m crdu•
adJustment Ill US pollry 11. ill. n l>t ct to
Europe Indeed , I bccau ar. ad,ocn<".Y
of this cou1se long bcfor< wc b<<"ame lmmcn:.ed in the conftlct 111 \'wlnnm or
deeply concerned with quc,tlons of balance of pnvrnpn s
Bef01 ~ closmg, I would like to rraffitm
U1at the propo ed resolution 1n no \\ ay
exclude C{)nsultation \\ 1th our NATO
allies. or \\ ith the SoviC't Union, for that
rn:\ttN I v. ould bE' less than frank, ho\\ever, if I d1d not , tate t.hat I do not
favor U1e kind of con$ult..at1on that turns
into a prolong('(} rxt•rcise for dl'ftl nng
dcctstons and action.
And before closing, I should also hkr
to emphns1ze that thts resolution does
not Intrude in any way on the b:\..~1c n·.SI>onstbility of the Pre~ident for the conduct of foreign rplalions. Under tl.s
terms. the Presidt•nt would d1"C1de tlw
number. nRturr, and t1mhw: of any 1 cductwns in U.S. forces in Euror><• Buc
make no mistake, if adopted this n>Solution will express the oobcr adv1cc of t.he
Senate that the number of US . torc('s
in Ew·ope should be substantially reduc!'d
m pres!'nt circumstances. It would
supercede in this fa.,h1on the advice on
the same subJ!Cct whtch the Senate gave
to another Prcsidtnt In 1951-and on
which he acted-that the US. commitment of forces on the Ew·opean Continent should be incrl'asl'd from two to
six divisions in the c1rcwnst.nnccs tll<'ll
prevailing. In ~>hort, th1s resolutton calls
upOn those who remain shackled to nn
outdated policy based on a Europe as 1t
v. as yesterday to face up to the fact tllM
tomorrow will always SCE'm to be a bettt·r
time to take the action whtch 1s w ·gcntly
required today.
In this connect1on Mr. Prcsidrnt. I
ask unanlmous consent to have pnnt!'d
at this point in the REcono an excl'llr.nt
re::-earch paper done at my ri'Quest by
Miss Elizabeth Stabler, analyst In Western Europtan Affairs, of the Legislative
Rcfl•rcncc Serv1ce of the Library of Congress It covers NATO force goals , the
contnbut1ons of NATO mrnrb rs, and
the conscnpt1on pollctes of NATO nwmbers, as well as otlwr pHtiiiPnt mformatlon .
I urge Senat01 s to look owr th1s outstanding study by M1ss Stabler. bccau e
I think they w11l find much to d1gest 111
it, and much to wond('r and P0lldl'r
about .
I further as~: unanimous cmiSent U!llt
on page 18 of the resea1 ch paper "'lllch
I have in my hand. at tht• conelus1on of
the J)aragmph on Luxembourg, a r.to1 y
earned In U1r New York Ttrnes on January 12, 1967, be msert.c<i herein at tltat
point. Furthermore, Mr Prcstdl'nt. I
ask unanimous cow nt, ro that It 'lloill
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France: In 1952. France had aLout five
somewhat undcrstren~ th divisions assigned to Afcent, with about four of these
divioions stationed in Germany. Followinrr the outbreak of the Alr;erian rebellion
in latr. 1954, France in l!J55 and 1956
wi thd rcw three of these dl visions and
other units for service in Algeria, with
the understanding that they would be
1·ct.urned as soon as po.ssiblc. The depleted French forces in Germany
amounted to about 1 1 2 divisions. These
divisions were brought up to the strength
of two divisions when the Algerian war
came to an end in l!J62. They were
modernized but were never moved to the
forward positions required by NATO
strategy, Other French forces stationed
in Al ';cria were brought back to France
but were not reassiQ;ned or earmarked to
NATO command.
On July 1, 1966, the two French divisions stationed in Germany-about 60,000 mrn-and tactical air units stationed in Germany-about 10,000 menwere withdrawn from NATO command.
On the same date. French personnel assigned to the integrated NATO commands were withdrawn. Some of the
French air units stationed in Germany
have been redeployed in France. The
Frrnch and West German Governments
have recently reached an agreement that
permits the continued stationing of remaininr; French forces in Ge1many on
the basis of the 1954 London and Paris
accords and an exchange of letters of
understanding. NATO and French military authorities have yet to agree on a
mission for these forces.
The steps taken by the French Government on July 1 completed the withdrawal
of French air. naval. and ground forces
from Afcent and other NATO commands.
No French forces are at present assigned
or earmarked to these commands. In
March 1959, the third of the French
Mediterranean ileet that had been earmarked to NATO's Mediterranean command was withdrawn. In June 1963,
France announced the withdrawal of
naval units earmarked to NATO's Channel Command and Atlantic Comm.and.
In April 19G4, the French Government
announced the replacement of French
naval officers assigned to these commands by liaison officers. In recent
months. the French Gol'ernment has also
indicated that permission for NATO military planrs to fly over French territory
will be granted on a monthly rather than
a yearly basis. that France will no longer participate in NATO's Military Committee. and that France will continue to
make financial contributions only to a
selected few NATO Infrastructure projects. The French Government has contemplated liaison arrangements with
various NATO and national commands.
These arrangements as well as ones providing for French participation in .an
integrated air defense system covering a
sector of northeastern France have yet
to be worked out with NATO authorities.
At present, France has about three
active divisions stationed In France in
addition to those in Germany. In 1961,
the French army numbered over 800,000
men. By 1966, It had shrunk to about

330.000 men. This reduction in size was
in large part a result of heavy expenditures on the development of a nuclear
striking force. The present striking
force, consisting of supersonic planes
carrying 60 kiloton atomic bombs, is not,
as far as can be determined, coordinated
with the strategic forces of either Great
Britain or the United States.
West Germany: When West German
rearmament was originally contemplated
within the framework of the abortive
European Defense Community, it was
agreed that West Germany would raise
armed forces of about 500,000 men including an army of about 400,000 men,
and would contribute 12 divisions to the
Community. These force goals were carried over into the London and Paris accords of 1954 under which Germany was
invited to accede to NATO. Force goals
for the \Vest German army have be::!n
postponed or tacitly revised downward a
number of times, partly because West
Germany's 12-month period of service
under the draft-changed to 18 months
in l!J62-did not permit the raising of
sufficient manpower. At present, West
Germany's 12 divisions still suffer from
a shortage of manpower, and especially
from a shortage of officers and trained
technical specialists. For lack of training areas in West Germany, West Germany's armed forces have also been
obliged to seek areas for exercises in
other European countries. Some West
German military authorities acknowledge that West Germany probably has
the equivalent of only eight full divisions
at present. They dispute the claims of
some American officials that German
armed forces suffer from serious deficiencies in equipment. With the exception of a small territorial force-28,000and an even smaller reserve for local defense. all of West Germany's armed
forces-total about 440,COO-are assigned to NATO.
Luxembourg: Luxembourg's army has
shrunk from about 5,500 men to about
2,000 men in the last 5 years. The artillery battalion of 500 men attached to
American forces in Germany consists of
volunteers. An infantry brigade would
presumably be available to NATO after
mobilization. In recent months, there
has been pressure to disband the army
entirely and to rely on neighbors for
defense.
Netherlands: In the late 1950's, the
Netherlands reorganized its army to provide two active divisions instead of one
active division, and two reserve divisions
instead of four reserve divisions. In recent years, the size of the army has
shrunk from about 98,000 to 85,000. In
addition to two assigned divisions, the
equivalent. of about two divisions is earmarked to NATO command.
United Kingdom: In the 1954 London
and Paris accords, the United Kingdom
undertook to maintain on the Continent
the four divisions-about 77,000 menand tactical air force it stationed at that
time in Germany, unless overseqs emergencies or a heavy strain on external finances dictated otherwise. Withdrawals
would be subject to the approval of Saccur and a majority of the Brussels
Treaty powers. In its 1957 white paper
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on defense. the British Government announced, without apparent preliminary
consultation with its allies, that it intended to reduce the British Army of the
Rhine-BAORr--to 64,000 men within
the next 12 months and ultimately to
45,000 men, that it would reduce its
armed forces by almost one half by 1962,
and that it would rely more heavily on
nuclear deterrent power. The Government anticipated that higher expenditures on strategic nuclear forces would
require reductions in expenditures on
conventional forces. It assumed that
steady improvements in relations between France and Germany made the
presence of large numbers of British
troops on the Continent less urgent.
After lengthy negotiations with NATO
military authorities and West Germany,
Great Britain agreed to limit its withdrawal.:; from BAOR to 22,000 men. At
the same time. the British tactical air
force stationed in Germany was cut by
one half. Britain's present commitment
of 55,000 men to the BAOR has been
variously described as the equivalent of
2 \13 or 3 divisions. Commitments to the
dzfensc of Malaysia and disorders in
some African members of the Commonwealth entailed further reductions in
1964. l<'!aving r..bout 51,000 men in the
BAOR.
In recent years, British spokesmen
have consistently argued that NATO's
force guidelines should be adjusted downward from supplies and supporting
troops to sustain 90 days of conventional
combat to supplies and supporting personnel to sustain 10 to 30 days of conventional combat. In recent months,
British authorities have been reported to
have decided on cuts of from 15,000 to
20,000 men in the BAOR unless West
Germany agreed to increase substantially
its contribution to offsetting the costs
of maintaining the BAOR in Germany.
The redeployment of some supplies and
support troops to England would apparently permit cuts of at least 10,000 men.
For the time being, however, it has been
reported that all cuts have been postponed in view of the fact that the United
States has apparently agreed to spend
$35 million more than planned on arms
and services in Britain in 1967 while
United Slates-United Kingdom-West
Ge1man talks on troop deployment.
strategy, and offset agreements continue.
The strength of Great Britain's army in
1959 was about 324,000 men. In 1966, it
stood at about 218,000 men.
United States: In 1950, the United
States had troops amounting to about
1 \I! to 2 divisions stationed in Europe,
most of them stationed in West Germany
as occupation forces. In September 1950,
President Truman announced that he
had approved substantial increases in the
strength of U.S. forces stationed in Western Europe. In April 1951. the Senate
passed Senate Resolution 99 expressing
"the belief of the Senate that the threat
to the security of the United States and
our North Atlantic Treaty partners
makes it necessary for the United States
to station abroad such units of our Armed
Forces as may be necessary and appropriate to contribute our fair share of the
forces needed for the joint defense of the
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be easll"!r reading ror Members of the
Senate, that the entire study be prlnU>d,
not In Wlnll print, but In the \L~ual size
print.
Th PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection? 1 he Chair hears none, and
It Is so ord red.
There being no obJection, the researd1
paper was ordered to be printed In the
RECORD, as folloW
DECEMBJ:R 23, 1966.
To; Hon MJCHAJ:L MAN FIELD.
F'rom: Foreign Affairs Dhlsfon, Legislative Reference Service, the Ubrary of
Congress.
Subject. NATO force goals, the contributions ot NATO memb rs, con cription
policies of NATO members.
Clm:D.Al.

JU:J.~,\ItltS

There arc sPvcral diillculllcs in estimating NATO forCl goals and the cxte11t
to which NATO members have meL their
commitments. First, it has been the
lonf{-standing policy of the va1 ious
NATO commands and of the individual NATO members to classtfy NATO
force coals and the extent to which these
goals have been met. In recent years,
the United States and Great Britain have
not always followed this policy in respect
to their Individual NATO commitments.
West Germany's comnutment in respect
to ground forces Is known because it was
written into agrccmcnl.s preceding \Vest
German accession to NATO. Nevertheless, the commitments and actual contributions of some NATO members have
been the subjrct ne1ther of officml statements nor of w1official speculation.
Second, to the extent that some NATO
ground force goals and the contributions
of NATO members are known, they are
usually expressed m terms of divisions.
But the nwnber or men assumed to a
division and the nwnbcr v.:ho contnbute
support to a diVISion vary widely For
example, Secrcta1-y McNamara recently
painted out that a dhislon shce in the
U.S. 7th Army statwned in West Gt:rmany amount!'Q to about 45 ,000 men
whereas a West German division slice
amounted to about 17,000 men .' Therefore, a NATO member may well have
met Its commitments in terms of the
nwnber of d1vis10ns ass1gn!'Q to a NATO
command. But these div1 ions may fall
and log1 t1c~ support that 1s, m terms of
manpower, staffing, eqwpment, traimng
and logi.Hics support; that is, in terms of
general combat rcadmess. MoreovPr,
especially on NATO's C!•ntral front in
West Germany, these di\lslons may not
be deployed as far forward as NATO
strategy reqmrcs It IS generally be·
heved that \\lth the exception of the
US 7th Army, most NATO dlVISIOilS
show deficiencies m many of these respects Anulable Information howenr,
doe not permit detailed docum ntat1on
of this point.
Tlurd, whereas NATO g10und force
goals for the central European rctoiAfcent-Aihed Force Central Europehave been the subJec of many unolllc1al
pubhshed reports, Coree goal for northern EuroJ>e- Afnorth-and for soullwrn
• Th~ «ecrelary waa usln~ the figure o:
lull dlvtslona and 225 000 m~n lor the

nv.-

l S romm m~nt a1 d 12 dhlsl ns and 210000 men r r Lhe Y. l Germnn C'Onlrtbul on
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Euror>e-Afsouth-appear to be lnrg( ly fore
ate hlll'.Y Tl1c ext nt to wlu h
umeportcd. S mllarly,
the
dcsir d • A ro comm mls cnn oount on
m
s length n.nd d•·tlclcncles In NATO nn\al • earm rk d force a 1l11n c rnmttand &lr forces a1e d1fl cult to c tnbh h. m• n 1 u'lclear.
Ancl further complicating the task of
1 h folio n r ort rrll , on puu !ely
m a urlng national contributiOns again t a\ a liable n d t1 1ef rt• n• co
rll inforce goals is the d1stlnctwn b(' ween complete mfo1 m lion H include , fir t,
forces "a IRned to NATO"-tho com- a tuble 1\ II a ct Unl d br<"akdO'I\ n ot
ing under the operational command or rrport d NATO fon·e oats and tho cOmcontrol of Snceur for p£ acet1me t1 nmh
mJtm nts and cu1 r• n c 11t1tbuUons or
and dunng emergulcles under condi- NATO mo rnb rs onh for the ror-ouud
tions aRrN'<I by e:>.ch country-and forrP 1.1 1 ned to tht• Crttcinl and n·nforc<'s "earmnrkc•d for ass1 nment to tral sector that IS, to t\fcent; st·coml,
NATO''- thosc forces which natwns tables shouin curnnt contnbutlon of
have agreed to n i n to a NATO com- !li'Ollnd foJct•s nt Afnorth and AI outh;
mand at some future time-in many ttm·d, a It tmg ot NATO countllt~ that
cases. reserves v. luch v. ould presumably g1n~ a\·atlnble lllfonnnuon on chan o•s
be avallabl · only v.:Jtll!n specified pe- 111 c·on Cl iptlon policio s: fourth, n table
riods aflcr mobilization . The onlr slto\~ 111 dl'fl'n • expcnd1tuns as a P< rforces at ))Icscnt "assigned" to NATO crnta e of •ro
national produrt for
't\'IO mcmbns, lllth, n tuble showing
a1 e most ground forces ~talioncd in Europe and some tactical a1r units. Force npprO\:ed NATO Infrastructure co tgoals and commitment.~ for "earmarked" -shal ing formulc.s.
I. rorn grmls, uahontll rnmmr 1 n fils, uutl
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In February 1952. the North Atlanuc
Council mcctinr: at Lisbon Is beheved to
have approved 1954 !UOund force goals
for Afcent of between 25 and 30 combatready divisions and between 30 and 35
resprve divisions capable of mobilization
within 1 month. These goals were not
even close to being met m 1954, or 111
1957. Followmg a study by NATO's Military Committee in 1956--57-MC-70Afccnt force goals for the end of the
prriod 1958-63 were reported to be Sl't
at 30 combat-ready diVI Sions and considerably fewer reserve d1vls10ns. It was
al~o reporte-d that MC 70 set out a reQUirement for lhe stockmg of supplies
and eqUipment to su&tam these 30 diviSIOns m the field for 90 days IL is general!\· lx'lieved that only US dl\1 10ns
have met Uns rcquin•ment.
Follow mg a new study by NATO s :\111llary Conumttre-::I.IC-96-Afcent fore"
goal for the end of the penod 1961-66
\\ere repot l<'d to be set at 28 13 combat-rcadv dl\1 ions for tile central front
lL wa niso repo1 ted howev1~·. that mlhtar:y authontws at SHAPE eollllllUt'<! to
r nrd 30 coml.>at-readv diVISIOns as th<'
m n1mum requirement for the Cf'ntral
front. • · lthrr the 28' 1 n~quht•mcl t nor
the 30-diVIS on requ rcment IJa\e ever
lx'en met m tem1s of aSSJ 111 d d1 visions
In April 1965 wh! n W t G~'rmans orgaruzed and conunttted to NATO ts 12th

(1111

tnn th.

divisiOn, and when F'rnnce still assi1•twd
two diVISIOnS to NATO command, Afcent might be said to have had about
27' 3 a.~swned divisions. No information
has lx'en found on present requiruncnts
fo1· reserve clivi Ions.
C'.

NOTF.S

ON

.N'\riONAI
C'UNTRlUt 1111
1\f'fFNT

$

TO

Belgium : BelgiUm s o.rmy has ~hrunk
in si7.c by about 10,000 men In the last
5 years. In 1963. four battallons-ubout
2.000 men-were rrdeploycd from Germany to eastcm Bel 1um. TherP ha\e
tx-en M!veral rercnt rrports that the Belrnan Crtlvemmcnt has decided to rrque t
a reductiOn ln 1ts military commllm• nts
to NATO from six to fow· brigade , or
from Its two diVISions at pr <ent t1 I'll th
to tv. o dlV1sJOns at half present su c•n th .
Two reSNVe diVISIOns are eat mal k~d to
NATO
Canada· canada has malllt.ailu d an
mfnntry bn ade croup 111 Wl'.st Gf rmany
snce llH• \\1nlfr of 1951 52. Tlw
stH•n tit or th1 bn adc appears to haH'
remamed constant Canada matnuur ( d
12 a1r squad ons m .uropc 111 tJ,e 1V50
Canadian J squadrons In Euror) now
number eight and v.11l be rcduc• d from
ei ht to x when v.o xistlng SQUadrollS taLionet1 In France a1 absorbed
mto IX sqaadrons tatloned In :v l
G rmanv Tv.:o truantry brlgad
roup
ta loned In Canada ar earmarked for
d ployment to Europe
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North Atlantic area," approving "the
understanding that the major contribution to the ground forces under General
Eisenhower's command should be made
by the European members of the North
Atlantic Treaty," and approving plans
to send four additional divisions of
ground forces to Western Europe. By
the end of 1952, the equivalent of four
additional U .S. divisions had arrived in
Europe, with the bulk of them stationed
in Germany.
In April1954, and again In March 1955,
President Eisenhower declared that it
was the policy of the United States "to
continue to main tam in Europe, including
Germany, such units of its armed forces
as may be necessary and appropriate to
contribute Its fair share of the forces
needed for the joint defense of the North
Atlantic area while a threat to that area
exists, and will continue to deploy such
forces in accordance with a greed North
Atlantic strategy for the defense of this
area." President Kennedy, In a February 1961 message to the Permanent
Council of NATO said: "While relying
also on the growing strength of all, the
United States will continue its full participation In the common defense effort.
I am convinced that the maintenance of
U.S. military strength 1n Europe is essential to the security of the Atlantic
Community and the free world as a
whole." President Johnson, in a similar
message to the December 1963 Ministerial Session of the North Atlantic
Council said: "To NATO's continuing
fulfillment of this task-that of creating
a balanced defense posture-r pledge my
country's will and resources. We will
keep in Europe the equivalent of six
American divisions that are now deployed there, so long as they are needed;
and under present circumstances there
Is no doubt that they will continue to be
needed. I am confident that our allies
will also make their full contribution to
this NATO defense, so that the burdens
and reponsibilities of partnership may be
equitably shared."
On the basis of the 1951 Senate resolution and Presidential statements such as
those cited above, the U.S. commitment
In respect to ground forces assigned to
Afcent has usually been described as "a
fair share" or the equivalent of the approximately six divisions deployed in
Europe by the end of 1952-for "as long
as they are needed." Secretary McNamara, In a June 15, 1966, press conference
referred to the U .S. commitment as five
divisions and to the authorized strength
of U.S. Army forces to support this commitment as 225,000 men.
The strength of U.S. ground forces
assigned to Afcent has remained relatively constant since 1952. During the
1961-62 Berlin crisis about 40,000 more
U.S. troops were sent to Europe, reportedly bringing the total number of
U.S. ground forces stationed in or near
Germany to about 280,000. These reinforcements have since been withdrawn.
In the spring of 1966, the Department of
Defense confirmed that about 15,000
specialists had been or were being withdrawn from the U.S. 7th Army for
service in Vietnam or the United States.
Secretary McNamara has since said that

the sending of replacement for these
withdrawals would be completed by the
end of 1966. Unofficial reports in the
spring of 1966 placed U.S. withdrawals
from the 7th Army In the range of
30,000 to 45.000 men. The present
strength of the five U.S. divisions and
three armored cavalry regiments stationed in Germany is believed to bP. between 210,000 and 225 ,000 men. A farge
number of the some 56,000 U.S. airmen
stationed in Europe are also believed to
be attached to U.S. forces in Germany.
ll. GROUND FORCE CONTRIBUTIONS TO AFNORTH

AND AFSOUTH: Mll..ITARY CONTRIBUTIONS OF
PORTUGAL AND ICELAND
A . AFNORTH

Denmark: All of Denmark's armed
forces-about 50,000 men-are reported
to be either assigned or earmarked to
Afnorth with standing units of 2%
infantry brigades and three battalions
earmarked to this command and some
active reserve units assigned to the
command. Denmark's Army totals about
30,000 and has remained at relatively
constant strength during the past 5
years.
Norway: All of Norway's armed forces
are reported to be either assigned or
earmarked to Afnorth with standing
units of a brigade group and several
battalions earmarked to this command
and most reserve units assigned to the
command. Norway's armed forces have
decreased in size in the last 5 years from
about 40,000 men to 34,000 men, with the
army shrinking in size from about 21,000
to 17,000 men. Norway is reported to
have committed itself in 1952 to maintain standing units of two full army
brigades.
West Germany: One of West Germany's 12 divisions assigned to Afcent Is
also assigned to Afnorth and is stationed
in Schleswig.

United States: Several thousand
marines are believed to be assigned to
the U s. 6th Fleet which is in the
Mediterranean and
earmarked
to
Afsouth.
C ICELAND AND PORTUGAL

Iceland: Iceland has no national military establishment.
Portugal: Portugal has earmarked one
division of 18,000 men stationed in Portugal to NATO command. It is believed
that this division is at present only at
half strength. Most of Portugal's army.
totaling about 120,000 men, is stationed
in the Portuguese provinces in Africa.
One air force reconnaissance squadron
is assigned to NATO.
IlL

CHANGES

IN CONSCRIPTION
NATO MEMBERS

POLICIES

OJ.'

Efforts have been made at various times
in the past 15 years to persuade NATO
members to acce!)t 18 months as the
standard term of service for men
drafted Into the armies of NATO countries. There appears to have been no
period, however, when all NATO countries with a draft required 18 months
or more service. Military authorities at
SHAPE continue to believe that even 18
months service is inadequate, and that
the minimum service period required Is
24 months, in view of the time needed for
the adequate training of troops in modern armies.
Belgium: Military service was extended
from 12 months to 24 months in March
1951, reduced to 21 months In August
1952, reduced to 18 months in May 1954,
reduced to 15 months in 1957, and reduced to 12 months in September 1959.
Military service is currently required for
12 months, and for 15 months for certain
categories of specialists.
Canada: No compulsory military service since the end of World War II.
B . AFSOUTH
Denmark: Throughout the 1950's,
Greece: Greece has 11 infantry di- Denmark appears to have had a 16visions, two of which are reported to be month term of service for army draftees
close to full strength, and one armored and an 18- to 24-month period of service
division. Eight of these divisions are for drafted noncommissioned army offiassigned to NATO. About 10,000 men cers. In September 1963, the term of
of the Greek Army are currently sta- service was reduced to 14 months for
tioned in Cyprus. Greek armed forces men serving In the armored forces and
total about 160,000 men and the Greek signal units, for which formations there
Army about 118,000. Both the armed were enough volunteers. Recently, the
forces and army have remained at rela- period of military service has apparently
tively constant strength in recent years. been reduced to 12 months for army
Italy: Italy assigns seven divisions and conscripts and 14 months for drafted
five Alpine bridages of 8,000 men each to noncommissioned officers.
France: In December 1950, France inAfsouth. Italy's Army has decreased in
size by about 30,000 men in the last few creased the period of military service
years and now numbers about 270,000 from 12 months to 18 months. During
men. Italy's total armed forces cur- the height of the Algerian war, the
term of required service was 27 months.
rently number about 376,000 men.
Turkey: Turkey's ground forces total This was reduced to 18 months in 1962
16 divisions, four armored brigades, four following the reestablishment of peace
armored cavalry regiments and two para- in Algeria. In 1965, France replaced its
chute battalions. Fourteen divisions are system of universal military service with
assigned to Afsouth. Turkey's army has a system of selective service as part of its
shrunk in size in the last few years from program to modernize and reduce the size
about 400,000 to about 360,000 men. of the army. The present te1m of service
When Turkey bombed Greek Cypriot is 16 months with the possibility of
positions on Cyprus in August 1964, it release 1 month early.
West Germany: West Germany estabwithdrew some air units assigned to
Afsouth. These units were returned in lished a system of conscription in 1956.
a few days, at which point Greece an- The terms of service was set at 12
nounced that It would not go through months. In September 1961, this term
with its announced intention of also was extended by 3 months on an emergency basis. In February 1962, the servpulling some units out of NATO.

IO~AL

0;\GRI
Ice unn was xtcnded to 18 months,
v. hlch Is the requirement today.
nr
Th term of nice cun~nUy
rC'qulrcd In the arm~ I 24 months, Wlllch
em to ha\ e b n the term required
!nee at lc t 1959
Iceland. o nai10nal military c tab11 luncnt
Italy: The requh d t.ctrn of scnlcc In
Ut
rmy was 18 months m l!l59. In
Oc obrr 1962. this term \\as 1 educed to
15 month, which Is the clllreut rcqnhenwnt
Luxembourg. In 1959. Luxembourg requhed 12 month cnice for men draft-!'d
IIlLo tlw army This t('rm v.as r duced
to 9 months In Augu L 1963, and reduced
to 6 mon hs as or January 1, 1966. In
Novl'mhcr 1966, th('re \\as a govcrnmPnt
cri Is as a re ult of an order to draH 400
men Into the army The Socialists have
urged an Immediate end to the draft.
The Cltr! tlan Soclahsts favor ending the
draflin July 1967 after consultation v.llh
NATO anthorlties. There are also pres. urcs to d1sband the army entirely.
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arm • cmcrccnc resc e of 11 000, ln
v.hlch some men v.ho completed their
national sen1c unC:er the old ssst m
'1111ll
n e unUI \ oluntary 1ecrultment
r ·aches n at! actory lc\ I. Other\\ I
\ olunlary military sen 1cc 1., completely
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nitcd ~tates: Uncia the Sci cti\'e
Scn1re Act of 1948 army draft<· v.cre
ri'Qulrcd to serve 21 months. This penod
of .I'I\ 1cc was inc1 ea.cd to 24 months 111
1951, and has remamed at 24 months
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Mr. JACKSON.
fr, Plc !dent, will
the Senator y1eld?
Ur. MANSFIELD. I yield.
Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I commend the able nnd dlstlngul hed ma3 5 jority l!'adcr for hi action today In &uggezt:ng the refenal of the Senate resolu4 0
3. 2
tion to the Foreign Relations Commitll'C
eo and
to the Armed Service' Committee.
6.1
4 3
As Is well known. all of us In this body
('I
do not agree on the Issues ral~ed by this
4 0
I S
resolution which go to the very heart
4 'l
of the military balance that the West
4 3
7 R has worked so long and hard to constmct
h ~
I think we might all agree, however, thnl
7 I
these vi tal matter cannot be settled
8. 4
hastily, and should not be considered
lightly, and that It Is v.:l.o;e and proper
to follow the regular procedures of the
Senate.
I therefore support the suggestion of
the majority leader that this resolution
be referred to the Foreign Relations and
Armed Services Committees. In that
way, the resolution can be considered
along v.lth other points of view and related r!'solutlons and In the light or full
testimony from the appropriate officials
of the executive branch, Including the
Joint ChiC'fs of Staff.
In this connection, I ask unanimous
4 6I
s. 4 consent that a. speech which I made
3.117
before the Military Committee of the
U.16
NATO Parliamentarians' Confrrence on
21 Hr
.M Novemuer 15, 1966, entitled "The Will
0
6. ',II To Stay the Course," be printed in the
.I~
RECORD at this point.
4 :!3
There being no objection, the speech
2.611
.30 was ordered to be printed In the REcORD,
I.IO
ns follov.:s:

n p cent of gro • rn~tlonal product 195 ,
1058, 1964, 1965 I

3. 6
4 6
3.3

[F'rom the New York Tlmcs, Jan. 12, tnG7J
.LfVVQ ON:-J O.L !>llnOBW'<X l'J ..

"LUXf'M80VRG, January 10 CReutersl . LUX I mbourg, v.hich contributes an army
of 1.800 drartrcs and 500 volunteers to
lh!' North Atlantic Treaty Organlzation,
will abolish the draft, Premier Pierre
Werner •aid Tuesday. He said In Parliament that his new Catholic-Soclali~t
Government would nev:otiate with NATO
on the future role of the Luxrmbourl!"
Army. planned as a for<:e of BOO regulars."
Netherlands: The required term of
military service appears to have been 18
months for nonspecialist low-rank army
draftees In the late 1950's. In the early
1960's this term was apparently extended
to 20 months for the same category of
draftees, and then reduced to 18 months
In October 1963, still for the same category of draftees. Longer penods of service were required for other categories.
Recently, terms of service In the army
have been reduced to 16 months for some
cate ories and 18 months for other
categories.
Norway: In March 1954, Norv.ay increased the term of sen ice required for
army draftees from 12 to 16 n:onths. In
1963, the term of service was reduced to
12 months, which is the current r~.;quire
ment for army draftees.
Portucal; The current required term
of sen·ice In the army Is 18 months for
some catc~;orles and 24 months for other
categories. Tills reqmrement has been
In effect since at least 1958.
Turkey: Turkey currently requli"E.'s 24
months cnice for army draftees. This
requirement has b~en 111 effect since at
least 1959.
Unlt.('d Kingdom: In the 1957 v.hite
paper on defense, the British Go~ern
ment announced Its intention of abolishIng compulsory military scnice by 1962,
If volunteer recruitment for a significantly • mailer army was satlsfactor). At
the time of the white paper, the required
t.erm of en·tce In the Br!Ush Arm· ~as
24 month . This continued to be the
required term of sen·tce until No\ ember
1960, when callups for army service
ended, 2 years earlier il1an anUclpat.ed.
Grc t Britain continues to h \e a small
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TH& WrLL To STAT TH& Coullllll
(Speech by Senator Henry M. Jackson, before the ~Uiltary Committee, NATO Parliamentarians' Conference, Paris, France,
November 15, 1900)
I

My home Is In Wn.shlngt.on-not Washing·
ton, D.C. but the State or Wa.ahlr.gt.on. Tokyo Is an overnight flight from Seattle
Saigon is a r~w hours farther rou•b. To
u.s who live along the Pacltlc the war In Vlctnrm, !Ike •he WfU' with Japsn that I> gnn
25 years ~o next month, seems very cl06e.
and our s nd there \'ery Important. 1 diJ
not a.ak you to agree, but I hope that a.a
friend among friends I may
II: ~ou to try
t.o understand our po~~IUon
We a.re deeply committed We ha"e commit ed very large ma.terlal reaourcea and,
more Importantly, many thousands of our
young men
We have not lightly atll:.ed
them t.o Il:Ulke their aa.crJftc-,..a, Analtogles
with the put may be mlaleadlng and I would
nc.t argue that this 1a the 30 s all o~er ng n
But 1 king back v;e think. a.a I am sur"
m.&ny C>f )OU do, hat I La wtu t.o atop agg•e&~~ on
!ore tbe aggresaor ~ &l.ronil
and swollen wtt.b ambiUon from amaU sueWe think the world ml ht haa
been p red enormou. mlator unea l! Japnr.
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hnd not been permitted to succeed 1n Manchuria, or Mussol!ni 1n Ethiopia, or Hitler
In C7.cchos!ovak1a or 1n the Rhineland. And
we think tha t our sacrUl.ces 1n this dirty
war In 11 ttle VIetnam will make a dirtier and
bigger war less likely. It ts on that basl.8
tha t we ask young Americans to tlgh t 1n the
jungles and mountains or VIetnam.
I am or course deeply concerned about
VIetnam, as most or you are and as most
Americans are. We have honestly tried to
convey our readiness to stop the fighting on
terms as consistent with the Integrity or
North Vietnam as they are with the Integrity
or South VIetnam. We would much rather
make peace than war.
In a long run sense, however, I am not
anxious about the outcome 1n VIetnam.
Our goals are 11m1 ted and our forces are
strong. I am confident that In time the adversary w111 see the advantage to hlm In a
settlement that involves net ther the conquest
nor the surrender or either side.
I am certalnly not anxious about the Atlantic AIUance, but In the long view It Is at
the center or our concerns, !or It Is on what
happens here, In this community, that the
world's prospects !or peace with freedom and
justice chiefly depend.
The strength and confidence of the Atlantic ames remain the single most decisive
factor In world atralrs.
It was with this fact In mind that a United
States Senate subcommittee, whlch I have the
honor to chair, thls year held a major set or
hearings on the Atlantic Al1lance. It was
with thls same !act In mind that I opposed
In the Senate the h asty passage of any resolution relating to American forces In Western
Europe that might; be Interpreted- by allies
or adversaries-to mean a reduced American
1n terest In Europe.

n.

The member states of the Atlantic All!ance
may take Justifiable pride In their basic
policies In the years since World War ll.
Their historic a ssociation In the Marshall
Plan and In the North Atlantic Treaty have
transformed the weakness or the late 40's
Into the strength of the 60's. North America
and Western Europe have enjoyed an unparalleled period or prosperity and growth.
They have used their strength on several
occasions to resist aggression against the
small and the weak; they have used their
prooper!ty to support large programs or assistance to the poor. They h ave taken long
strides toward the creation of a European
economic community- a process that Is o!
course !ar from complete. Together with
Japan and other countries they have reduced
barriers to trade and de veloped Impressive
practical measures or International monetary
cooperation- and In these fields also more
history 1.s In the making.
During these years the defenses o! the Atlantlc A!Uance h a ve been greatly strengthened, both absolutely and relatively. The
shl!t In the b ala nce or power since 1949,
coupled with firm reaction to Soviet testlngs
or our resolve- fro m the first Berlin crisis to
the Cuban missile crisis-has produced a remarkable and hopeful stabilization In Europe.
The rears that seized sober men less than two
decades ago have quieted d own. No armed
attack has been made on Western Europe,
and l! we maintain an appropriate balance of
forces and a firm resolve, none Is likely. Our
hopes that a genuine European settlement
will one day be attained rest o n Soviet recognition or, and respect !or, the durability or
this balance, the constancy o! our resolve,
and. It should be added, the restraint we have
consistently shown In the use or our power.
A traditional saying has It that "where
there's a will, there's a way." Our experience
In the Atlantic Alllance confirms lt. We hnd
the will to turn weakness Into strength and
we have. We had the will to be both firm
and restrained In the tests to which we have
been subjected. The combination has been
the foundation or peace In the Western world .

The question now Ia whether we have the
will to persist In our efforts. I! the wind
from the East blows warm !or a time Instead
o! cold, w111 we shed our NATO cloak? We
see among some young people and even
among some who are old enough to know
better a temptation to assume that because
no attack has been made, no defense Is necessary. Aesop would appreciate a logic that
concludes that because what we have been
doing has worked, we can safely quit doing It,
Security, as we all should know, Is not a
condition; It Is a process.
The circumstances of 1966 are not the circumstances or 1949. As times change, the
Alliance can and should adjust. But the allimportant question remains the same; to
paraphrase Winston ChurchUI, It ts this:
will the Atlantic allies stay the course?
m.

The tasks of deterrence and defense stretch
on ahead, therefore, as far as any of us can
see. We do not know what Soviet Intentions
are, and neither does the Soviet government.
Intentions are not airy abstractions. They
are what one Is actually going to do. And
what one Is going to do ts always shaped
in part by how one thinks the other fellow
can and wUI react. I! there Is little d anger
of a deliberate and massive Soviet attack,
It Is In part because the Soviet government
dares not assume that an attack would not
be strongly resisted and, 1! pressed, that It
would not qUlckly lead to a nuclear response.
We cannot have the same confidence, however, that the Soviet government will refrain
from exerting political pressures, or manufacturing local crises, or probing here and
there to test our will or to exploit a local
opportunl ty. The danger Is that any such
action could grow to dangerous proportions.
Soviet forces are stUI sta tloned In the center of Europe, as are Western forces. In
terms or numbers or NATO and Warsaw Pact
ground forces effective enough to be quickly
employed In the central European area, the
ratio Is roughly 7 to 10 In favor o! Soviet and
satelll te troops.
Central Europe Is therefore, as It has been,
an armed camp, where large forces equipped
with the most powerful weapons or war confront each other across an arbitrary boundary that no one thinks pemanent. We cannot be satis fied with a stabilization that rests
on this foundation.
Furthermore, the evidence Indicates thnt
the Soviet government Is gambi!ng enormous
scientific and material r esources on the
chance that It may be able to seore a decisive
advance In weapons systems. It now has 700
to 750 MRBM and IRBM launchers, mostly
located ne..r Its Western borders and targeted on Western Europe. According to Soviet rnllltary leaders their strategic offensive
and defensive nuclear weapons systems have
been quantitatively Increased and qualitatively Improved In the last !ew years. Their
underground nucleo.r test program and missile testing program lend support to these
claims-and plainly the Soviet government
does not accept the Idea that military t echnology has reached a platenu and that the
present balance o! forces cannot be upset.
I take It !or granted that the Soviet government will do all It can to reduce the
American lead In nuclear weapons sys temsa lead that provides a r eassuring margin or
safety for all o! us. I also take It !or granted
that prudence requires the American government to fully Implement the safeguards,
spelled out during Senate consideration o!
the nuclear test-ban trenty and agreed to by
the President, to Improve Its capabilities.
It is our profound common hope that ways
can be found to turn events ln a happier
direction . There must be a better way to
nssure the legitimate security Interests or
both sides than to maintain an armed camp
In Central Europe. If and when the Soviet
government sees an advantage In reciprocal
reductions In forces, th!.s could surely be done
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so as to advance the leglt!mnte srrurlty Interests o! all concerned.
IV.

For some time the allles have been discussing allied troop levels and burden-sharIng. The danger Is that what begins as a
review might end In bickering, loss or mutual
confidence, an d weakness- unless we proceed

very carefully and In full awareness of the
Importance or not putting In )eopnrdy the
hard-won mill tnry balance.
This range of problems Is now under discussion by the Britis h , German, and American governments, with the asslstnnce or the
Secretotry Genernl of NATO. I hope thnt
certain guidelines will be observed as these
discussions proceed :
One.

A subst...'1ntial American presence In

Western Europe Is a key to stability. The
main purpose of the American troop commitment Is to leave no doubt In the Kremlin
that the United States would be Involved,
deeply Involved, !rom the outset or a move
against Western Europe. It needs to be clear
that Russian forces would meet enough
American forces to mnke the engagement a
Soviet-American crisis, not just a European
one. This means, In my judgment, that a
token American force Is not adequate. It
should be an effective combat force, not Jt"t
something to be tripped over. but a force
capable or putting up a serious fight.
Two. The adequacy or allied conventional
forces should be measured In terms of their
ability to meet and contain sizable but less
than all-out attacks by conventional forces
of the Soviet bloc.
The allied conventional forces, like the
American component, are not present In
Western Europe as a kind or hostage whose
destruction would trigger a nuclenr response.
No one, surely not the Soviet government,
can suppose that a massive assault on Western Europe could be even briefly restricted to
conventlonnl forces. Indeed, the Idea of a
big conventional war Is so tar-fetched that
we do not need to prepare for that contingency. I! a massive attack Is to be made,
It wi11 surely begin with a nuclear strike
against Western Europe and North America.
not a movement of great armies across We~t
ern boundaries.
No, the real political and military function
of allied conventional forces Is to resis t and
contain a limited attack, thereby confrontIng the adversary with the choice or cnlllng
It otr or of enlarging It, with all the risks
the latter course would Involve-In particular, of course, the risks o! provoking tho
employment of the American Strategic Air
Command .
It Is time to put aside the unrealistic force
goal or enough conventional NATO forces
to meet and contain whatever conventlonnl
forces the Soviet Union could order Into
action.
At the same time. however. nothing less
than a force capable of containing a sizable,
though ltmlted, attack Is adequate, for a Jesser force would tempt the Soviet government
to test the all!ed will, and would confront the
allles with the choice of backlng down or
Initiating a general nuclear war.
In a crisis we need to be able to deploy
at once military forces strong enough to hold
rather than give ground, thus Improving our
diplomatic pooltlon. This Is one of the lessons we have learned tn Berlin.

I am re-

minded of what General Norstad sal<.l at the
hearings before our Senate subcommittee
this year :
"It ts argued In some places that conventional forces were things of the last war or
even or the 1914-1918 war. I was In a pooltion to 'supervtse' the part o! our forces In
the Allied Forces during several confrontations In Berlin. The movement or troops,
the wllllngnesB to use or comml t troope, wa.s
an important Item. I Just do not think we
could have met those requlremente lf we hnd
not had the conventional forces we hnd."

.!o 1 Zl n 1 y 1 !J, 1 9 G7
Tl ,.,., It Ia I
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Ule head-coun of 'ATO'a
onal !ore Ulan Ulelr oomt>nt
pabtl t} t.ha~ counta
A the 14 adju t to l.be f renc:h v.1 thdro."' al
!rom NATO I ~hlnk w can make aome savln
ln British and Amt'rlcan log! tic and
upport <'lcmenta ln Eurore wHhout ~rltlc
lr ~ c mb t st.rcncth
l<>roo,er, In Ume, t.cclmologlcal a.<l\anc
m r permit aomo roouctJon ln tho number
or American and Brtll h forces garrisoned on
~he con~lnent v.ithl,ut a reductJon or t.he
pov.cr that c: n bA brought 1.0 l>t\ar In an
emergency. Dc\l!loillnMlt6 ln strategic mobll•ty, both air and £ea. oomblned v.lth the
prepo~~ltlontng o! suppllC6 1\nd equipment, or
"dual b:lSlng," hold out ~he poo..~lblllty or
quick reaction oter hundrooa and evon thousand.<; or m.tl<-'6. 'I11ore hl\ve aloo been remarkable lncreAAeS lu oonvcnUonal fire power
and t.actJCJ\1 moblllty which have yet to be
fully exploited by our NATO forccs.
But any act.lon MSOCiat.cd v.1th these technological ad,·ances &hould be taken only arter
earne&t, thorough conslderat•on or how reliance on t.be60 development.~ v.111 a.tl'ect prC6ent. capabilities In the field o.nd the Western
bargaining position vts-a-vts the Ea.<t. We
all need to take a careful look at the evldcnc
Including a.n up-to-d!\t<l, realistic appraisal of the Soviet ru>d Ea.bt European s1 tua.tlon. We shOuld certainly not be lmpre66Cd
by unsubstantiated rumors-no matter what
their lofty sour~ t.ha.t Soviet troop& t.n East
Germany and Central Europe have be<ln reduced and th<>.t So•·lct Intentione are lncrl.'aatngly pel\Ccful. Hopes and rumors are
a very dangerous diet!
Four. A roouctlon or NATO's conventional
forceo in Western Europe should be llnked to
a l'('ductlon or force levels on the other side.
A major and ns yet unachlevoo purpooe or
tho Atlantic Alliance Is to reach a. genuine,
stable Europcan .ACttlemcnt wlth the Soviet
Union. Among other things, such a. settlement wHl Involve the return or Soviet torceo
1.0 the Soviet Union. How can the Soviet
government be encoumged to move In thts
direction? Certainly not by throwing away
basic el~menta or our bargaining p051tlon
through one form or another ot unilateral
ctltbacl< or diRCngagcmcnt. Surely we should
retain the bargaining pnsltlon we havl"
worked so long and hard to con.•t.ruct, and
actively pursue acccptanC<l or gradual and
balanced revisions In forces on both sides.
Fu·e. The actual mix or o.llled forces In
W~tcrn Europe should underlJne the fact
that the commitment to the de fellS<! of Westen> Europe ls tn1ly a. collective Atl!\ntlc commitment. British, Belgum Dutch, Canadian.
Amertca.n. German and. whenever relln.ble n.rrangementa nre po681ble, Fren~h troops, are
ne<'ded In the central region for this purp<J6e,
just as combined forcf.'s and commands arc
nl'('<led m othH regtons for thr same purpo.s<!
Furthermore, in the very Important central
rf'gtOn H v.·ould he unwise for any one nation
to provide a d1 proportionate sha.re. Our
Germ. n frtcnds v.111 not misunderstand us tr
we hn\e Germany e>pcclally In mind A dtsproporUonate Grrmn.n contribution runs
counU'r to the gonl of strengthening En.stern
Europ~·s conftdenr~ In NATO s purj)OIIf'S
It
could lso complicate the problell11! of thr
Germana them..elvee In v.orklng out v.1th
the1r nt'lghbora nd Msoclalt's the future
roll' of German} 111 Europe.
S z TI1e mix of for es Is clOfl('ly related <>
the problt>m or nchte\ In a more ri!'A.SOnnble
allocntion or deft'nl'e burdens among the allu'6 When we c<>nsldcr natloll!ll shares m
thl' <'<'Onomlc burdens o! defending the 1\ort.h
AtL'l.Ht.ic are.. lnequttles are nppa.rtnL The
hurdtm clearly falla more hcll\lly on 110me,
lncludmg the United States, th n the olhers
I l<nrno·, or course, th t s 1 1on 111m:. If
oould n t de• 1se a r rmul" for urden-&harln lhnt would ~m completely lair 1.0 e\cr on~
A• d In nn\'
there Ia a Fohor
e or
Solom ""'· We must therefore de 1 v.l h the
con"·n~
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proolcm
1ves, nd the probll'm Ia one
t.hat challeng
our Ingenuity, our ... nse or
tn.lrn • and our r.ln rttr In ll\ing up 1.0
our obligation under Article 3 of our treaty
for ' continuous and elfect.ive self-help nnd
mutual aJd"
The words or thnt obligation v. ere carefully
u<~>d tn the order or ~heir Importance· "&elfhf'lp and mutu!\1 aid" Countrles that are
cl <$l to the front ltne cannot In reality
expert a country thll Is rurther away to extf'nd mutual aJd unless there Ia some evidence of suhstauUnl self-help. When Ulat
Foell -help Ia not reasonable 1ll amoun
when
In some 001<es It ndda up 1.0 doing almO&t
nothing-It ls dllllcult In a country further
away from the rtsk to achieve strong or brood.
support for mutu11.1 ald . Inevitably the demands grow to do less
I have used my Influence. such as It Ia. In
support of mamtalnlng a. substa.n.tla.l Amertcun combat !O<"c~ In Western Europe. I know
that moot or you share my view of the Importance of such a. force. But lt will become
Increasingly difficult to maintain Aroerlca.n
support f•>r those or you on thts side or the
Atlantic who want such a force unlcss you
are also prepared 1.0 a.ccept a. greater share
of the coota of protecting the North Atlantic
area.
In the twenty years since the war Americans have contributed over $120 bllllon to the
economic and military restoration or what
we call the free world Con tro.ry to the views
o>eprcssed by some o! our critics we do not
expect gm\.Jtude for this, But to a growlng
numbf.'t' or Amenca.n cltlz.en.s It seems that
there should a.t least be understanding that
when heal~h and ea.rnlng power are restored
we should not be exp<!eted to continue to
bea.r more than a reason!\ble share oC th.e
burden
A substantial United Statee presence ln
We tern Europe w111 not be brought to an
end by our adversa.rlea, but lt can be endangered by our friends--by !allure on
their part to realize the burden the American cl Wz.en ha.s borne and the frame or mind
he Is in when he sees allies that are strong,
healthy, nnd with an earning power growing
a.t a rl\te exceeding Ills own, who are not
contrtbuUng proporLionawly to the costs or
the common defense.
The problem 1s bound to be or concern for
my country because or our major expenditures for defense o! other areas In the world
or lmportan.ce to all free nations. At a minimum It does not seem unreasonable to us
to expect that our contribution In the At1 •n tic a.ren should no longer Impose a heavy
drain on our monetary reserves.
I know that some or the allies have particular econom1c problems---balance or IX'Ymoot dltllculttes or budgetary dilemmas-which seem to Impede the contrtbutlon of a
!a.lr share And prosperous as we are, none
Of U3 h ,IVe r<"SOUrceo to SQUander. Of COUT"e
v.e want adequate defense at as low a C06t
as we can mr<n g . The point to be emphasl><"d 1& th.<t the economic problems lne\ltabl} lnvol\e a fundamental polltlcal
probiPm · to devl e burden-sharing and other
arrnngen1ent.a wr.Jeh wtll support ralner t..Ila.n

up l't """ lntt'lliRtnt llllocatlon of defense
ta5ks among t<lltcs
v
In the months :.nd } ears that lie allead
thl' Atlan 1c Allt.a.n~ wtll undergo many
ch:mgcs. It must I! I~ Ia to ""n·e the purposes alld Interests of the members. It ha.s
o!len hcen snld not nlwnys with Justice but
w th enou •h truth to make It sting, that
gene• Is prepare !or the l!Ut war It could
he ld "'1 h P<"rhapa equal justice and truth
that poll ct ns and dlplomata of!Rn havr
heir e}e& on the problenu or the p:t.P.~ rather
Ul n the future The A antic A1llanc~ .,.. ...
f~rv.
l-1 • klng In ll'49
It ahould be
<'qually !orv;ard I lr. ng In 1966.
I t.ake It U1M our Fren~:oh !rlend~ hAve
decided to H It o 1t •n the aldellnea tor

awhllr That Ia theJr df'~ 51 n Tb~ r l o!
u contlnut' t<> think that our U.SOClBUon In
NATO and 1~ lnt<'ruaUonnl t'Onunand& &H\N
our vlt.nl ln~rt' t6
1 personally c.anno lms.gtne a time v.'llen
Of' circum t.a t<'
In .., hlch, the Alii net' v.lll
be obsole•
n ana.chr< nl&m
u e th~
future, 1\4 I t'e It, will be tlllt>d "'lth IA&ka
nnd challrngN v.·e csn but m(>f't not In lao:>la •
Lion but In a.saoclatlon
Let mt' conclude, thrre!orr, with tht' proround hope that the dlalogur IUllong all th~
allied peopiNI wlll continue t.n the eplrlt or
genrf061ty and goodwill that ahould be round
among friends, and thtl.t Ia the vital apt\rlc ot
nn aaaocll\tlon lhl\t haa done much gOOd fnr
all or u. . .nd we may add, for thf! worldand that can accompllah much more, nlly,
must a.ccompllsh murh more It we a.re all to
piny our part In creating a world In which Individual liberty can aun·he and tlourlah

